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Jennifer Lynn Kelly

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Asymmetrical Itineraries: Militarism, Tourism, and Solidarity in Occupied Palestine

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In 2009, French artist Julien Bousac designed a map of the West Bank titled “L’archipel de Palestine orientale,” or “The Archipelago of Eastern Palestine” (see fig. 1). With a nautical anchor affixed in the upper left corner, the map transforms West Bank cities and villages into islands depicted in different shades of green to signify different levels of Palestinian autonomy. In the bottom right corner of the map, Bousac explains that all areas in Israeli hands—aux mains d’Israel—were transformed into the sea, and white space representing Israeli settlements blends almost seamlessly into the sea-foam backdrop. Jericho is its own island far off to the east; Ramallah is an island in the center of the archipelago; and Bethlehem is severed from Ramallah, with the Canal de Jérusalem and the islands of ’Anata and Ar-Ram peppering the waters in between. Israeli nature reserves, designated by green stripes, take up the space of some of the otherwise Palestinian landmasses, and Israeli military roads, signified by dotted shipping lines, function as the only connecting thoroughfares between the islands.

Bousac’s map is based entirely on data from B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization. It is part utopia, populated by names like the Isle of Olive Trees and Honey Island. It is part dystopia, with dotted lines signifying shipping links that connect all the Israeli ports to one another. It is part maritime war-craft imagery, as tiny blue Israeli warships—zone sous surveillance—are positioned everywhere that there were permanent checkpoints in 2009. It also is part a mockery of the existing regulatory regime of the West Bank, with tiny palm trees signifying protected beaches and highlighting how Israel uses the discourse of protected land to secure its own space. Bousac’s map illustrates—via a military and a tourist imaginary—how the US-brokered Oslo Accords fragmented the West Bank into enclaves separated by checkpoints and settlements that maintain Israeli control over the West Bank and circumscribe the majority of the Palestinian population to shrinking Palestinian city and
village centers. His map details the impossibilities of both movement and any semblance of conventional tourism in the West Bank, demonstrating how settler colonial state practice can create island formations without water, using checkpoints, walls, fences, and military outposts to disrupt any contiguity between Palestinian space.

I begin with Bousac’s map because it asks us to consider the fragmented archipelago that the West Bank has become. Like Bousac’s map, I too want to chart out the post-Oslo fragmentation of the West Bank and ask when and how those landmasses in between seas of checkpoints and military roads become navigable, and for whom. In this essay, I explore what happens when subjects under occupation attempt to circumvent the archipelagic logic that divides them. What possibilities are both made available and made impossible when tourism, militarism, and anti-occupation activism occupy the same space? In what follows, I show how, in the context of ever-shrinking Palestinian access to their land, Palestinian tour guides and organizers are using tourism, despite its limitations, to expose the fragmented terrain they have inherited and to attempt to stay anchored to the land they still have. I trace how the Oslo I and II Accords, and the attendant establishment of the Palestinian Authority and its Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, both changed the parameters of what was possible in terms of Palestinian-led tourism in the West Bank and also fragmented Palestinian land, ushered in a period of expanding settlements, and entrenched an aid-based Palestinian economy. Drawing from interviews with Palestinian tour guides, many of whom have been organizing tours of occupied Palestine since the first intifada, I detail how what began as informal, impromptu tours of the West Bank to supporters of the Palestinian struggle has mushroomed into an income-generating, if somewhat provisional, enterprise. I also focus on the deeply and, I argue, deliberately asymmetrical nature of solidarity tourism in Palestine: Palestinian tour guides are guiding tourists through spaces that, often, they themselves cannot go in an attempt to use tourist mobility to highlight their own immobility under military occupation. These guides and organizers have chosen to dedicate their energy to solidarity tourism, even when its role in movement building is difficult to delineate and its effects are shot through with contradictions, because they value its role in helping Palestinians, from shop owners to farmers, stay on their land in the face of forced exile. In this way, this essay focuses on the fragmentation of Palestinian land and the fraught ways in which Palestinian guides and organizers
have sought to demonstrate, negotiate, and work against this fragmentation through the unlikely vehicle of tourism.

Studies of tourism have often focused on the power relations and forms of consumption that animate travel and tourist development. For instance, a range of studies, particularly in anthropology, have focused on privilege and leisure within tourism, the inevitable social distance between host and guest, questions of cultural appropriation, tourism’s role in nation making, the pitfalls of voluntourism, and the ethics of sightseeing itself. Within American studies and other interdisciplinary fields, a rich and growing body of work explores the role of domestic tourism in race making, “toxic tourism” highlighting environmental injustices, militourism, and the intersections of tourism and US Empire. And, where tourism studies meets postcolonial studies, many scholars have done the necessary work of showing the multiple ways in which tourism often facilitates and disappears past and present colonial violence. My research brings together work on tourism in American studies and comparative colonial studies, classic and contemporary works on tourism in anthropology, and canonical studies of tourism in postcolonial studies that have demonstrated how tourism can either pave the way for colonial projects or replicate and facilitate them. At the same time, I take up the provocation of those scholars who have recently asked if tourism can advance an anticolonial and antiracist praxis. I explore the contradictions, exploitations, and voyeurism that inhere in solidarity tourism, alongside the strategic uses of mobility in a context of restricted movement and the moments where tourism functions, if only aspirationally, as a site of anticolonial politics.

Much of the research on tourism in Israel/Palestine, meanwhile, has focused on the tourist industry’s role in the “business of peace” and the “consumer coexistence” that shaped the Oslo period, or the role of forms of domestic tourism in shaping Israeli national identity. There is also an emerging body of literature on “alternative” or activism-oriented tourism in Israel/Palestine, or what I refer to here as solidarity tourism. Alexander Koensler and Christina Papa, for example, argue that, despite their intent, solidarity tour itineraries often clash with the goals of locals. Rami Isaac, for his part, focuses on the important role of alternative tourism in the Palestinian tourism industry and in the Palestinian economy more broadly. While my work engages these extant studies, I depart from them by analyzing why Palestinian organizers and their allies are choosing tourism as a vehicle for activism and how organizers, in addition to tourists, are negotiating, and even utilizing, the asymmetries that inhere within their profession. Drawing from participation on more than thirty-five solidarity tours in the spring, summer, and fall of 2012, and as many
interviews with guides, organizers, community members, and tourists, I focus on the fragmented landscape tourists traverse and the asymmetries that animate their travel. I discuss these im/mobilities in Palestine not (only) because they reveal stark power differentials in tourism under occupation but precisely because they reveal tour guides’ self-conscious and deliberate strategizing to circumnavigate their landscape of dispossession. Pressing tourist mobility into the service of their anti-occupation work, Palestinian tour guides are attempting to circumvent the borders and checkpoints crafted to divide them and, simultaneously, work against their own expulsion.

**Professionalizing Solidarity in the Post-Oslo West Bank**

In the years before the US-brokered Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, solidarity tours mostly consisted of informal groups visiting Palestine to learn more about strategizing and to demonstrate their commitment to Palestinian liberation. Curious internationals and solidarity activists traveled most often to Beit Sahour, where they came to learn about the tax boycott and alternative farming practices that were making the small town near Bethlehem famous. During this time, Palestinians were prohibited from becoming officially licensed tour guides in the West Bank. Indeed, the Israeli military leader and politician Moshe Dayan allegedly once quipped that he would “be more willing to license a Palestinian fighter pilot than a Palestinian tour guide,” demonstrating the profound political importance of the ideological narrative Israel was advancing through tourism. Rami Kassis, director of the Palestinian Alternative Tourism Group, explains, “These policies were designed to suggest to tourists that Jewish Israelis were the country’s only inhabitants. Allowing tourists to talk with Palestinians, who would tell the stories of their past and continuing suffering, their culture, and their traditions was unacceptable in the eyes of the Israeli government.” In attempts to shore up notions of Israel as a “modern miracle state” and the “only democracy in the Middle East,” then, Israel restricted Palestinians from using tourism to narrate their past and present displacement to an international public.

Although the Oslo Accords were presented as a peace plan meant to lead to eventual Palestinian statehood, they in fact splintered the West Bank into city centers under nominal Palestinian control (Area A), villages under administrative control of the Palestinian Authority and security control of Israel (Area B), and land under complete Israeli rule (Area C). As Bousac’s map demonstrates, Israel has foreclosed Palestinian development and construction in the majority of the West Bank through legal, administrative, and military
means. Israel has designated Area C, home to 180,000 Palestinians, as “state
land,” reserved wholly for Israeli settlements, military stations, infrastructural
projects, parks and nature reserves, and the path of the Wall.\textsuperscript{26} Area C also
includes 165 “islands” of Area A and B land, the space to which the majority of
Palestinians in the West Bank are circumscribed.\textsuperscript{27} The Israeli land expropria-
tion that accompanied Oslo was written into the implementation of the “peace
plan,” functioning, in Israeli historian Ilan Pappe’s words, to solve Israel’s long-
standing dilemma of “wanting the physical space without the people on it.”\textsuperscript{28}

Oslo also introduced closures, curfews, roadblocks, and checkpoints meant
to contain and immobilize the Palestinian population.\textsuperscript{29} The population of
settlements doubled in the years after the Oslo Accords, with Israeli-only
roads connecting settlements and severing Palestinian communities from one
another.\textsuperscript{30} Palestinian lawyer and author Raja Shehadeh recounts how the post-
Oslo militarization of the West Bank was accomplished largely via settlement
expansion; he describes how “one hilltop after another was claimed as more
and more Jewish settlements were established” on the land that once provided
“the setting for [his] tranquil walks.”\textsuperscript{31} The roads connecting each hilltop
settlement bloc—the \textit{liaisons maritimes} in Bousac’s formulation—formed, in
Shehadeh’s words, “a noose around Ramallah.”\textsuperscript{32} Even more, the violence that
accompanied each settlement transformed the tenor and terrain of the land;
Shehadeh describes his increasing encounters with militarized violence on
the part of both Israeli settlers and Israeli and Palestinian Authority security
forces.\textsuperscript{33} In this way, the fragmentation of Palestinian land brought on by the
Oslo process was made possible only through the machinations of military
occupation: a series of militarized immobilities in the form of checkpoints,
closures, settlement roads, “firing zones,” and roadblocks.

For this reason, after Oslo, when the establishment of the Palestinian Au-
thority’s Ministry of Tourism made it possible for Palestinians to be trained as
tour guides, civil society organizers and newly licensed guides began to launch
feasibility studies to explore the possibility of \textit{alternative} tourism. They sought
to design and develop a tourism that foregrounded military occupation instead
of highlighting solely the depoliticized sites the Palestinian Authority deemed
national heritage sites. Organizers began to bring delegations and groups to
Palestine, particularly from the United States, with the express goal of teaching
them about the contours of Israeli occupation. This alternative tourism subsec-
tor grew in a context where general tourism to Palestine was also increasing
as a result of the newly established possibility for Palestine to host tourists.\textsuperscript{34}
Between 1994 and the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, the number
of total tourists in the West Bank doubled and exceeded 105,000 per month.\textsuperscript{35}
Hotel capacity rose from 2,500 to 6,000 rooms and occupancy rose to 60 percent.\textsuperscript{36} Tourism employed approximately 1,000 people and came to account for 7–10 percent of Palestine’s gross national product.\textsuperscript{37} During the second intifada, between 2000 and 2005, the alternative tourism sector experienced substantial setbacks, as checkpoints barred tourists from entering Palestinian areas and 95 percent of those who had been employed by the tourism industry became unemployed.\textsuperscript{38} This constellation of statistics partly reiterates Debbie Lisle’s argument that “the tourist gaze requires a widely accepted cessation of military activity before the operations of tourism can be introduced.”\textsuperscript{39} Yet Palestinian guides and organizers do not structure their tours as a remembrance of violence that is relegated to the past; rather, their tours position the colonial violence of Israeli occupation as an uninterrupted stream of dispossession, an “ongoing nakba.”\textsuperscript{40} Further, during the second intifada, some solidarity tourists still visited Palestine and guides worked to create alternative itineraries during curfews and closures, always having, as one guide put it in an interview, a backup plan.\textsuperscript{41} By 2013, there were about 290 officially licensed Palestinian tour guides, a minuscule number compared with Israel’s 5,400 tour guides.\textsuperscript{42} Of the Palestinian tourism sector, I was told during my research, about 5 percent constitutes alternative or solidarity tourism, which speaks to the development of solidarity tourism as part of the larger economic sector and, on a smaller scale, an organizing strategy.\textsuperscript{43} These statistics reveal not only the monopoly Israel holds over the Palestinian tourism sector and Israel’s control over Palestinian borders, airspace, and entry and exit from Israel/Palestine but also the ways in which the Palestinian tourism sector, as a competing market, responds to market logics that necessarily privilege Christian pilgrimage sites over exposure of the occupation. Simultaneously, however, the Palestinian tourism sector makes space for a solidarity tourism subsector that is comparatively small in scope but still results in rotating scores of curious international tourists and year-round employment for Palestinian tour guides and organizers. While the Oslo Accords enabled the possibility and professionalization of Palestinian-led tourism, the business of solidarity tourism in the West Bank emerged as both a product and a critique of the Oslo Accords.

\textbf{Deliberately Truncated Spectacles of (Im)Mobility}

While early forms of commercialized solidarity tourism emerged in response to post-Oslo possibilities for Palestinian-led tourism in the West Bank, more recent forms of commercialized solidarity tourism have emerged in response to the perceived failures of other kinds of international presence in the West
Bank and Gaza. As Palestinian guides and organizers repeatedly articulated to tourists, “You do far more for our movement by writing your members of Congress than you do by getting shot by a rubber bullet at a demonstration.” This sentiment is a clear pushback against the desire on the part of internationals to “get shot by a rubber bullet,” what would otherwise be a feature of both disaster tourism and adventure tourism—tourism respectively defined by visiting sites of destruction and/or the desire to be part of the action.44 As one example of several during my research, I heard a Swedish youth who was volunteering on his gap year with one of the solidarity tour campaigns tell a tourist: “You can’t leave Palestine without going to at least one demonstration.” Here, demonstrations become not only a performance of Palestinian steadfastness, directed at Israeli soldiers and settlers, or a performance of international solidarity, but also a performance of another kind: a “must-see” show internationals have to catch before leaving the West Bank.

This critique of international desire to participate in protests, or engage in a politics of confrontation with Israeli soldiers, indexes a substantive shift from the days when the International Solidarity Movement began asking internationals to come to the West Bank and Gaza to serve as a protective presence for Palestinians under siege. The guides and organizers I spoke to positioned solidarity tourism in Palestine as a move away from direct action and protective presence and toward short trips meant to educate internationals—and then ask them to leave. Through this reframing of the role of internationals in Palestine, guides and organizers articulated a disciplined attempt to disrupt white savior narratives, wherein (mostly) white US and other international tourists come to Palestine to protect Palestinians. Even when they schedule moments of protective presence into their tours, solidarity tour guides and organizers resist positioning protective presence as the guiding logic of any of their tours. They repeatedly advise internationals not to provoke settlers or talk back to soldiers at checkpoints, and they rarely schedule Friday demonstrations into their itineraries. It is clear, from the fatigue of their narration, that this is something they have to reiterate often, repeatedly reminding tourists that it is Palestinians who pay the price for their actions.

In her analysis of the digital archives of the International Solidarity Movement, anthropologist Sophia Stamatopoulou-Robbins analyzes how ISM workers relate to Palestine and narrate their relationship with Palestinians. She reads ISM workers’ identification with Palestinians as a “prosthetic engagement” in which ISM workers see their own experience in Palestine as an extension and/or microcosm of Palestinians’ experience.45 In the way that ISM workers...
frame their work, she argues, they identify with Palestinians as “experiencing” occupation rather than acknowledging an identification with Israelis based on complicity in the occupation as US citizens whose tax dollars and government support Israeli state practice. ISM workers’ identification as “occupied,” even temporarily, allows them to deny their own privilege in their capacity to leave Palestine. Such critiques of international presence in Palestine that resembles ISM have made their way into the itineraries of solidarity tours. While there are some endeavors to show internationals “what it’s like,” there is a palpable turn away from allowing internationals to believe that they are “experiencing occupation” and toward an attempt to make them aware, at every turn, of their own privilege in Palestine.

As I show in the second half of this essay, what many solidarity tourists take away from their experience in Palestine is not a belief that they know “what it feels like” to be under occupation but rather feelings of “shame” and “guilt.” These alternating sentiments can be understood as sometimes productive and sometimes incapacitating for tourists’ attempts to be in solidarity with Palestinians under occupation. The shame and guilt tourists describe is directed not only at their governments, which enable Israeli occupation, but also at their own mobility in Palestine in contrast to the restricted mobility of the Palestinians guiding their tours. Written into solidarity tours is a negotiation of the fragmentation of the West Bank that includes, for example, handoffs of tourists at checkpoints between Bethlehem and East Jerusalem, separations between Palestinians and tourists in Hebron, and arbitrary searches at checkpoints and bus stops. In these moments, tour guides make tourists aware of their difference—not sameness—from Palestinians in terms of access, mobility, and privilege. Tourists, then, are encouraged (despite the sentiment they bring to Palestine) not to feel like saviors who are making it possible for Palestinians to survive occupation, and not to feel the same as Palestinians, as though, somehow, by their abridged visit to Palestine, they know what it is like to be occupied. Instead, solidarity tour guides and organizers are attempting to disrupt the “prosthetic engagement” that can mark forms of international presence in Palestine; they remind tourists of their privilege and ask them not to become a fixture in Palestine but to return home where their work is more necessary because of their government’s unabated facilitation of the occupation. “Your work is not here” is a refrain I heard tour guides repeatedly tell tourists during my research; they consistently redirected international desire to “stay” and “help” in Palestine and instead deliberately requested their presence as tourists for an orchestrated and curtailed amount of time.
Walking Tours of Occupied Land

The solidarity tour itineraries I participated in included day trips to West Bank cities and villages, weeklong thematic tours and/or advocacy workshops straddling the West Bank and East Jerusalem, bus tours through East Jerusalem, and walking tours in villages and city centers inside Israel that were once Palestinian. The itineraries were often structured around truncated visits in different cities where tourists participated in lectures, workshops, and guided tours. The tour guides I interviewed were independent tour guides, guides working with nongovernmental organizations, fieldworkers working to keep farmers on their land, guides working with human rights organizations, Palestinian youth volunteers, community activists who met with tourists, cultural workers, and executive directors of tourist agencies. The tourists’ own affiliations and interests included antiprison organizing, antiracist organizing, academic research, Christian youth activism, queer anti-occupation activism, YMCA employment, familial ties to the land, and no identified affiliations at all. Their relationship to Palestine ranged from having family in Gaza and the West Bank to having never seen Palestine on a map.

In some spaces, solidarity tour guides stage a dissonance between what solidarity tourists are there to witness and the narratives they overhear Israeli guides telling rotating scores of other tourists. For example, at the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, while most tourists hear narratives that focus solely on the birth of Christ, solidarity tourists will hear about Oslo’s division of the West Bank, land annexation and settlement expansion in and around Bethlehem, and the lives lost in the thirty-nine-day siege of the town and church in 2002. These scenes signal, for solidarity tourists, Israel’s monopoly over the entire tourism sector, even in spaces ostensibly under Palestinian control. In other spaces, solidarity tourists are given detailed explanations of how Oslo fractured the West Bank. In Beit Jala, for instance, tourists witness Israeli-only bypass roads connecting settlements that bisect and trisect Palestinian land. Guides explain that construction on these bypass roads began in 1993, seamlessly connecting settlements by cutting through Palestinian lands and olive groves. In other spaces, guides make tourists aware of the impact of the Wall on the economic and social life of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In Bethlehem, as tourists walk along sections of the Wall in between military surveillance towers, guides describe the effects of the Wall in its multiple forms as concrete barrier, military road, and electric fence. Guides take these moments to emphasize the impossibility of their own movement; one solidarity
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Tour guide frequently explains to tourists: “I can get to Copenhagen easier than I can get to Jerusalem.”

Guides further emphasize this gulf between Palestinians on both sides of the Wall by facilitating a “trade-off” of tourists at Checkpoint 300, which separates Bethlehem from East Jerusalem. Here, organizers make sure that tourists understand that their Palestinian guide, who has facilitated their movement around the Bethlehem area thus far, cannot go with them. Tourists walk through the labyrinthine corrals of the checkpoint and wave their international passports in front of the bulletproof glass while the Palestinians next to them have to show their wrinkled permits and ID cards and place their fingers in the biometric scanner. Armed teenagers serving in the Israeli military sit behind the bulletproof glass or pace above and around the tourists and workers corralled within the walls of the checkpoint. Palestinian workers often hurriedly try to get through, while tourists sometimes slow down the process, marveling at the cage they—only momentarily—find themselves in. Israeli tourism posters adorn the walls inside the checkpoint, inviting passersby to visit the Dead Sea, to see the beach in Tel Aviv, to “experience Israel.” The posters read, in English: “Every Day Is a Vacation.” This humiliation is further exacerbated by the presence of tourists there, who do have access to all those spaces. This experience of the checkpoint demonstrates the ambivalent role of the solidarity tourist as one who both challenges and affirm racial and spatial inequalities in Israel/Palestine. Tourists, in these walk-throughs, are presented with a checkpoint experience to, in some ways, simulate “the Palestinian experience.” Yet they are also given detailed information on how this is only some Palestinians’ experience: those who live in the West Bank, those who have work permits to even enter Jerusalem, or those who do this daily. Simultaneously, they are meant to witness, through this experience, how their own “checkpoint experience” differs vastly from that of the Palestinians next to them. In this way, even in these moments wherein guides attempt to approximate, for tourists, a sense of the occupation, they simultaneously work to make sure that tourists take note of the disparity in treatment they both witness and enact.

Guides further work to make tourists understand that the immobility they are witnessing is tethered to the racialized taxonomies of settler colonialism in Israel/Palestine. Inside the Old City of Jerusalem, tourists will see armed civilian settlers, settlers’ armed bodyguards in plainclothes, groups of heavily armed young Israeli soldiers on every corner, and homes that settlers have taken over. After this, tourists board a bus to hear explanations of Israeli house demolitions in East Jerusalem and witness the occupation’s effects, from the
lack of infrastructure and unpaved roads to the family reunifications made impossible with the Wall cutting through Abu Dis, splitting Palestinian neighborhoods in half, and severing the route that had long served as a throughway from Jerusalem to Jericho. Further, at various military checkpoints restricting movement in the West Bank, Palestinian guides will attempt to blend in with the internationals, allowing the Israeli soldier guarding the checkpoint to determine whether to let the collection of “just tourists” in. If the soldier mistakes a Palestinian tour guide for a European, or is otherwise too busy or distracted to notice, the guide will pass through the checkpoint unnoticed, or at least unflagged. Moreover, this “passing” is often only possible with a guard new to his or her post, as Palestinian tour guides in some of these spaces become recognizable to guards over time. Guides and organizers stress the arbitrary politics of identification in these contact zones; one tour guide routinely asks on his tours, when crossing the Qalandia Checkpoint with his yellow license plate that signifies Israeli citizens and residents of East Jerusalem, “Will they think I’m a Shlomo or an Ahmed?”48 He explains that usually he is Shlomo, but if the soldiers are feeling bored, if it is a slow day, he may be an Ahmed. Through this anecdote and others, tourists are meant to understand the extent to which entrance is contingent on “not looking Arab,” and all mobility is at someone else’s discretion; more specifically, this anecdote is meant to connote the deeply racialized policing of Palestinian mobility.

As a central part of showcasing militarized and racialized (im)mobility in the West Bank, guides inevitably bring tourists to Hebron; in my interviews with them, more than one guide emphasized, “you have to take them to Hebron.” In Hebron, tourists walk alone down Shuhada Street, which once hosted a thriving market, a street so busy, one guide tells each group of tourists, that he used to have to hold hands with his father in order to not get lost in the bustling marketplace. Shuhada Street is now closed to Palestinians, including those who still live on the street and have to enter their homes from the back, who have cages around their patios to protect them from settler violence, who have signs in their windows that read “You are witnessing apartheid.” Tourists often take in Shuhada Street alone, rarely seeing anyone else, since it has become a “ghost town.” The city’s main road is closed to the 177,000 Palestinians who live in Hebron, with access only to tourists, the 500–800 settlers who live there, and the 1,500–2,000 soldiers who protect them.49 Guides intend for tourists to witness some of the more than four hundred stores that have been closed under military orders, some of the almost two thousand others that closed because of all the closures and checkpoints, and some of the more than
When tourists file out of Shuhada Street to reunite with their guides, they exit walking on a street solely for settlers and tourists, while Palestinians file onto a street one-quarter the size of the one they are walking on, having to go through yet another checkpoint, and then another. Guides include Hebron in their itineraries, as it is such a starkly segregated space that unequivocally shows the violence of military rule while revealing the containment of Palestinian movement and tourists’ comparative freedom to “explore.” Through their itineraries in militarized spaces like Hebron, tour guides use the expansive mobility of tourists to underscore the restricted mobility of Palestinians; further, guides and organizers frame this contingency and racialized precarity of movement as a constitutive part of the regime of military occupation.

“I’ve Seen More of Palestine Than Many Palestinians”

If one ostensible goal of tourism—solidarity tourism included—is to sightsee, part of the work of solidarity tourism in the West Bank is to see Palestine, and much of this seeing, tourists come to understand, is often far more capacious and expansive than what can be seen by most Palestinians. When asked about what resonated most during a ten-day tour of Palestine in 2012, Maggie Goff responded: “As an American who grew up in the Midwest, just the overwhelming amount of militarism, and military presence, in the West Bank was really shocking. And the idea that I’ve seen more of Palestine than a large portion of the Palestinian population.” Here, much like Bousac’s map, Goff demarcates the two things that most stood out on the tour: the spectacle of military occupation and the expansive vision and mobility of the tourist. For Goff and other tourists I spoke to, the disparity between their own movement and that of the Palestinian guides and organizers orchestrating their movement is the starkest and most immediate memory they have of their time in Palestine. Yvonne Lory, another US tourist, describes her freedom of mobility at Checkpoint 300 and in Hebron as throwing into sharp relief both “the benefit and shame” of being a US citizen in Palestine. She recalled getting waived through the checkpoint while Palestinians were pulled aside and interrogated: “I would just get a smile and get passed right on by because of my passport.” In many ways, Lory was shocked more by the mobility and access she embodied than the discrimination she witnessed. Lory further described the guilt she felt in “touring” Palestine, as her “hard-earned money,” in reference to her tax dollars, was “going to make life a living hell” for Palestinians. In this reflection, Lory
describes her unchecked movement in Palestine and the shame of funding the system that enables that movement. In my interviews with them, tourists used the word *shame* with notable frequency to describe their tax dollars at work in constructing the geography of occupation in Palestine, to detail how they felt about the differential treatment they experienced and embodied as US citizens in Palestine, and to index their role as complicit subjects in the occupation.

Moreover, differently positioned tourists articulated their sense of “shame” in disparate ways. Sarah Alzanoon, a Palestinian American tourist who was on the same tour as Lory, also narrated the guilt she experienced as a US citizen in Palestine with the capacity to move throughout Palestinian space. However, Alzanoon’s narrative differs markedly from Lory’s and Goff’s. Alzanoon’s account demonstrates not only the complexity of solidarity tourism in Palestine but also the competing and multiple registers of complicity, familiarity, outrage, and shame that can inhere in a form of tourism that is structured as an anticolonial project. Alzanoon described her experience as the first Palestinian in her family—scattered, since 1948, across Jordan, Kuwait, Canada, and the United States—to see Palestine, outside of her relatives in Gaza, who have been unable to leave and whom she has never met. She described being detained at the airport for “somewhere between five and seven hours” before she was eventually allowed entry, kept in a room where they ostensibly “randomly check people,” but which was populated, in her words, solely by “brown people like me.” Alzanoon’s relationship to Palestine as a tourist is connected to both her brownness and her identity as a Palestinian American, coupled with the weight of being her family’s emissary of return—if only for a fleeting moment. Her first moments in Palestine echo countless other experiences of discriminatory and racist policies at Ben Gurion Airport at the same time that they set her apart from many of the other participants on solidarity tours.

While Alzanoon’s capacity for movement differed from her white counterparts with US passports upon her arrival in Israel/Palestine, once in Palestine and outside the airport, her mobility approximated their movement more than it did the Palestinians with whom she identified and felt a shared lineage. She describes, as one of the most resonant moments from her time in Palestine that continues to haunt her, when the bus she was on stopped at the checkpoint between Bethlehem and Jerusalem and all the Palestinians were ordered off the bus in order to be searched. Alzanoon recounted a soldier carrying an assault rifle beginning the search process as Palestinians around her began exiting the bus:
So they all get off the bus and then I get off the bus, too, because I’m [a Palestinian]. And this Palestinian lady looks at me, with this strong look, and she’s like, “you don’t have to get off; just stay,” is what she was pretty much telling me, like “you don’t have to go through this.” So I just stayed. So they all have to get strip-searched, pretty much all the Palestinian people, with Palestinian IDs, but because I was a foreigner—even though I’m just as Palestinian as them—but I have my American passport, I get more rights than the people that have lived there, and their ancestors who have lived here for hundreds of years, and they pay taxes to Israel.56

She rephrased this in more certain terms: “I have more rights than them, from being a tourist, even though I’m just as much a Palestinian.”57 Here, Alzanoon describes her fear and anxiety, her confusion about her place as a Palestinian American in Palestine, and her inability to comprehend the level of movement this time not restricted by her brownness but granted by her citizenship. Her role as a tourist, and not as a Palestinian, is sedimented in moments like this as much as it is troubled by moments like her detention in the airport. She thus describes her movement through Palestine as characterized by an expansiveness made possible both by her legal status as a US citizen and by her particular experience of diaspora, as a Palestinian American with the freedom to move around Palestine in contrast to West Bank Palestinians surrounding her, who are routinely subject to the violence and humiliation of checkpoints and whose movement is foreclosed at worst and surveilled at best.

Alzanoon further tethered her feelings of guilt not only to her tax dollars and her mobility within Palestine but also to her capacity to return home. She repeatedly explained how she can “go home and not worry that there’s going to be an intifada the next day.”58 While, earlier in the interview, Alzanoon articulated her struggle to enter Palestine as a mark of her otherness in Israel, here she positions her capacity to leave as indexing her privilege. Alzanoon’s ability to “go home” punctuates her ambivalence about her position as a Palestinian American in Palestine: in her experience of diaspora, “home” both must be elsewhere and can be elsewhere.59 Alzanoon’s time in Palestine thus serves as a painful reminder that, while she can see more of Palestine than the Palestinians who live there, she is not recognized as Palestinian in the same way—by either Palestinians or the Israelis who police them. In this way, even her mobility in Palestine is a reminder of her exile.60

Though differently positioned, and articulating radically different relationships to Palestine, many tourists with whom I spoke described these moments of their own asymmetrical freedom of mobility as the moments that most resonated with them and catalyzed their activism back home. These moments, in which they embodied, and not only observed, starkly racialized disparity in
Palestine animated their understanding of colonial violence and its effects. In solidarity tour itineraries, while tour guides are navigating and narrating the fragmented terrain they have inherited, tourists are rehearsing the segregation that inheres within it. Solidarity tours ask tourists to reenact and perform the very practices of apartheid that they are ostensibly in Palestine to critique. This, I argue, is not an unfortunate contradiction of solidarity tours or an accidental hypocrisy of their structure. Instead, it is a strategic choice on the part of Palestinian organizers and guides to employ the asymmetries of both power and mobility that make possible the movement of tourists in the West Bank in order to underscore the difference—and not sameness—of internationals in Palestine. Solidarity tour guides are not trying to facilitate an adventure tour that enables tourists to “play” at being occupied, nor are they encouraging tourists to embark on a disaster tour that results in tourists asking, “What can we do?” Rather, solidarity tour guides are crafting starkly asymmetrical itineraries that force tourists to ask what they are already doing that makes possible the freedom of mobility they are embodying and the containment under occupation they are witnessing.

Conclusion: Exported Tear Gas and Reminders of Complicity

In December 2013, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) donated almost $400,000 to Christmas celebrations on Manger Square in Bethlehem, a move both the mayor of Bethlehem and the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism celebrated as a boon to Palestine’s tourist economy. The logic behind this donation was to boost Christmas tourism to Bethlehem and “increase the share of tourist dollars spent at the birthplace of Christ.” Signs peppered Manger Square that read “USAID—A gift from the American people.” Local activists, however, wanted to show tourists what else constituted a gift from the American people: spent tear gas canisters and stun grenades fired at youth in the Aida Refugee Camp less than a mile away. Activists affixed tear gas canisters with “Made in the USA” emblazoned on them to a small Christmas tree in Manger Square to show tourists what their tax dollars, at a rate of $3 billion per year, were actually buying in Israel/Palestine. This method of exposing tourists to the violence visited on Palestinians in their name and with their money is echoed on solidarity tours. In spaces like Bil’in, where the village’s Popular Committee Against the Wall will host a tour group on a Wednesday and lead a demonstration against the Wall on a Friday, guides will pick up spent tear gas canisters and make sure that tourists take note of the label. “CTS” is stamped on the canister next to a complete address: Combined
Tactical Systems, 388 Kinsman Road, Jamestown, PA 16134, alongside the phone and fax number. “Made in the USA” can be read clearly on the label.

Mustafa al-Arraj, one of the coordinators of the action to decorate Manger Square with these other US “donations,” was arrested by Palestinian police later that day for disrupting the otherwise pleasant Christmas scene. Bethlehem police spokesman Loay Zreiqat, for his part, expressed concern that the grenades would “scare tourists.” Al-Arraj responded by pointing to the USAID plaques as a provocation: “They help us with schools and hospitals,” he explained, “but they also help occupy us. The United States is complicit in the Israeli occupation. They give us $1 for some project and then give Israel $1 million to hit us with tear gas and shoot us.” In this 2013 scene, we see a $400,000 donation from the United States to support “Palestinian tourism,” a simultaneous Israeli attack on Palestinian youth with US-made weapons only steps away in Aida Refugee Camp, and a protest installation crafted from the debris of the attack. We see Palestinian police arresting protesters for threatening tourism and “disturbing the peace” and Palestinian activists attempting to remind tourists of the ways they are deeply implicated in Israel’s occupation. Solidarity tourists, too, face constant reminders of their complicity in the structures of containment and racialized violence that they are ostensibly only witnessing. This is not a tourism defined by efforts, like those of the Ministry of Tourism, to simply increase the number of visitors to Bethlehem. Like the tourists in Manger Square, solidarity tourists are asked to rethink the narrative they are sold about Israel/Palestine. They are asked to reframe the question of what they can “do” in Palestine to what they are already doing that sustains the occupation, and what they can do, back home, to end it.

How much tourists are moved to action, and just how much they do when they get home, is exceedingly difficult to quantify. Many tour agencies and organizations have a difficult time tracking the work that tourists do post-tour and craft advocacy positions to discern more clearly the “outcome” of their tours. This is especially true because some of what tourists “do” post-tour is not always legible or immediately tangible—while some tour alumni participate in demonstrations and advocacy work, or report back to community groups, many others put what they witness to work by talking to their friends and family, letter writing, and joining already extant boycotts, divestment, and sanctions campaigns. Indeed, when I asked tour guides what they saw solidarity tourism doing, they often responded not only by describing what tourists do back home but also by emphasizing what they saw solidarity tourism doing in Palestine. In this regard, they spoke about a different kind of witnessing: not tourists witnessing the daily indignities of the occupation, but tour guides
witnessing small victories against the ongoing colonization of Palestinian land. Yazan Al-Zubaidy, then a fieldworker and guide on olive planting and harvesting initiatives, described the changes he witnessed from taking tourists to Hebron. He explained how the income provided by tourists eating with the same family in Hebron has, for example, allowed them to stay in their house. Even more, he adds, “before, where there was only their shop, now there are four shops around them.” Here, Al-Zubaidy describes how he—and not only the tourists—“witnesses” in Palestine. As a result of solidarity tours, he has witnessed one family keep their shop open and four other families open shops next door. “This is resistance,” he concludes. “Just to stay where you are. And to live.” He also detailed the effect this witnessing has on him, as a Palestinian living in Bethlehem. He defined his continual, repeated, and daily descriptions of the occupation as an inoculation against complacency in the occupation itself. The consistent narration of occupation, he argued, resists just accepting, for example, that the Wall is there. “Israel wants us to forget,” he explained, positioning his work as a solidarity tour guide as a refusal of that erasure.

Rooting Palestinians to their land, moreover, is not unrelated to the narration that recounts their dispossession. Baha Hilo, an independent solidarity tour guide in Palestine, described his work, and particularly his work on olive harvesting and planting campaigns, first, as trying to keep Palestinians on their land, and second, as a critical intervention in Israeli state-sanctioned narratives. Detailing Israel’s refutation of Palestinian narratives and Palestinian credibility, he explained how one narrative routinely gets circulated: “What Israel tries to do, through tourism, is sell its own story, where the Palestinian is not part of the story. The Palestinian is the problem in the story. The Palestinian is scary in the story. So, what has emerged today is that you find Palestinian people who are under Israel’s control trying to take over this job by themselves, trying to correct the story that the State of Israel sells about us.” This language of erasure, exposure, and correction parallels what Edward Said has described as the “permission to narrate,” noting that Palestinian refugees, in particular, have had to watch the “modern spectacle” of Israel, and the “unending ceremony of public approbation” for the force that dispossessed them, while being asked to “participate in the dismantling of their own history.” In this way, Hilo positions solidarity tourism as a disruption of the colonial logic that dispossesses Palestinians of both their land and their capacity to narrate.

Yet solidarity tourism is wholly, deliberately tourism. It is, by design, a truncated visit, a tour, with the tourists positioned as distinct from the Palestinians
facilitating their movement: differently situated, differently privileged, and differently contributing to the occupation they are ostensibly in Palestine to help upend. It is, in many ways, like tourism writ large: voyeuristic, reductive, and incomplete. Solidarity tourists come to Palestine with a host of assumptions and desires that tour guides routinely have to recalibrate in the space of less than a week and, sometimes, in the space of less than two hours. Solidarity tours are crafted—like the tree decorated with stun grenades—to produce a spectacle of occupation that tourists cannot continue to deny; they provide *evidentiary weight* of an occupation in which tourists are implicated and may wish they could ignore.72 Solidarity tours are also wholly, deliberately asymmetrical. Tourists walk in spaces their Palestinian tour guides cannot, get waved through checkpoints while Palestinians next to them in line get turned back, and stand on Jerusalem ground or Tel Aviv beaches that West Bank Palestinians can often only imagine.

In this context of shrinking access to their land—what Julien Bousac illustrated in 2009 as an increasingly archipelagic terrain—Palestinian tour guides are using solidarity tourism, in all its fraught asymmetries, to expose the fragmented terrain they have inherited and attempt to stay rooted on the land that remains. They are working to confront the fiction that heralds the United States as an “honest broker” in a “two-sided conflict” or, even more, as “aiding” Palestine, and the deception of a tourism that positions Bethlehem as Israel and Israel as a beacon of progress and modernity in a hostile and dangerous Middle East. Instead, they are working to expose the United States’ role in sedimenting Israel’s settler colonial violence that began not in 1967 but with the foundational violence of the establishment of the state, and continues apace with expanding settlements, the constriction of Palestinian movement, and the daily violence that threatens Palestinian land and lives. Like Manger Square’s grenade ornaments, solidarity tour guiding is a performance of transforming the detritus of war into ornamental reminders of complicity. These performances, their organizers hope, help Palestinians stay on land that has become a set of islands, help fashion four shops out of one, and help hosts stay in their homes under the constant threat of exile. When we imagine what it means to “tour occupation,” then, it is worth asking what solidarity tourism *does* and for *whom*, from those who craft its itineraries to those who traverse its routes, to those who witness, feel, and reenact its effects.
Notes

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2. Aware of the ways in which his map may lend itself to accusations of depicting Israeli Jews being “pushed into the sea,” Bousac underscores that his map is distinctly not about “drowning” or “flood- ing” the Israeli population, nor dividing territories along ethnic lines.” He explains, it “is simply an illustration of the West Bank’s ongoing fragmentation based on the (originally temporary) A/B/C zoning which came out of the Oslo process” (Mackey, “West Bank Archipelago”). It should also be noted that this map is not aspirational but diagnostic; it documents the post-Oslo fragmentation that has already marred the West Bank and Gaza.


15. In thinking about the relationships between tourism and colonialism, and especially how tourism has paved the way for colonial projects, I am indebted to Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978); and Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).


17. Waleed Hazbun, Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Middle East (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).


27. Ibid.


30. Ibid., 92.


32. Shehadeh, Palestinian Walks, 33.
33. Ibid., 87–97, 186–98.
34. For more on how the Oslo Accords also changed the landscape of Israeli tourism to Palestinian spaces, see Stein, Itineraries in Conflict.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
40. The nakba, or catastrophe, refers to the process by which 750,000–800,000 Palestinians were forcibly displaced from their homes and lands in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel. Solidarity tourists often meet with the Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights to learn about the ongoing Nakba through Badil's Ongoing Nakba Project (see www.ongoingnakba.org/en).
41. Ayman Abu Zulof, interview.
43. Michel Awad, interview by author, Beit Sahour, August 16, 2012.
46. Stamatopoulou-Robbins, “Joys and Dangers of Solidarity in Palestine.”
47. Many solidarity tours do employ narratives of sameness between delegates and Palestinians on the basis of solidarities between people living under forms of racialized occupation. Delegations of this sort include, among others, the 2011 Women of Color and Indigenous Feminist Delegation; Interfaith Peace Builder's African Heritage Delegations in 2011, 2012, and 2014; and the 2015 delegation of artists, journalists, and organizers from Ferguson, Black Lives Matter, the Black Youth Project 100, and the Dream Defenders. These delegations are instrumental in coalitional movement building, especially around boycotts, divestment, and sanctions organizing. At the same time, while in Palestine, these delegates often experience a freedom of mobility that is foreclosed to many of the organizers they meet Palestine. It is this difference that I am flagging here: a difference in mobility, access, and privilege in Palestine that can coexist with delegates’ shared experiences of colonization and racism with Palestinians and the complicated ethics of their presence in Palestine as US tourists (a paradox that is also evident, in part, in Sarah Alzanoon’s interview later in this essay).
48. Mary Louise Pratt defines the contact zone as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (“Art of the Contact Zone,” Profession (1991): 34).


51. Maggie Goff, Skype interview with author, September 14, 2013, emphasis mine.

52. For more on the militarization of Palestinian space, see Shehadeh’s descriptions of the militarized transformation of the landscape in *Palestinian Walks*, Weizman’s study of the (literal) hierarchies of militarized control in the West Bank in *Hollow Land*, and Gregory’s analysis of the spatialized manifestations of military power in Palestine in *The Colonial Present*. For more on the mobility of the tourist (and soldier-as-tourist) and the porousness of the war/tourism divide, see Lisle, “Reimagining the War/Tourism Divide.”


54. Ibid.

55. Sarah Alzanoon, Skype interview by author, November 22, 2014.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Many thanks to A. Naomi Paik for helping me think through the simultaneous displacement and privilege that coalesces in Alzanoon’s descriptions of home.

60. I am grateful to Bisan Salhi for helping me think through the experience of diaspora Palestinians in Palestine and the reminders of their exile that they experience.


62. Ibid.

63. Ryan Rodrick Beiler, “U.S.-Made Weapons Used on Bethlehemites . . . and a Cartridge in a Pear Tree!,” blog.ryanrodrickbeiler.com, December 6, 2013, blog.ryanrodrickbeiler.com/2013/12/06/u-s-made-weapons-used-on-bethlehemites-and-a-cartridge-in-a-pear-tree/. See also Harris, “In Little Town of Bethlehem.”

64. Beiler, “U.S.-Made Weapons Used on Bethlehemites.”


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.


72. The larger project from which this essay is drawn provides an extended meditation on the politics of evidentiary weight in solidarity tourism in Palestine. I look particularly at the historical ways in which Palestinians have not been constructed as truth-telling subjects and the privilege that inheres in the demand for Palestinians to provide evidentiary weight of their own, extremely well-documented, dispossession.